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Introduction
Until the early 1980s monetary policy was typically modeled as a control problem. In the models employed central banks make use of their instruments in order to stabilize the economy or, if possible, to contribute to a higher real growth rate, thereby treating the macroeconomic environment as given. Moreover, the design of monetary policy institutions was almost completely neglected. This view changed in the aftermath of Lucas' (1976) critique of the prevailing macroeconomic policy evaluation methods, which predicted the effects of policy experiments purely on correlations in historical data. The insight of the necessity to predict how market participants will react to policy changes led to the development of the game theoretic approach of monetary policy. Building up on earlier work by Kydland and Prescott (1977) on time-inconsistent policies, Barro and Gordon (1983) argue that monetary policy can be interpreted as a game between the monetary authority and wage bargainers. The basic message of the model is that a monetary authority caring about stable prices yet also having an ambitious output target will cause excessive inflation without any real effects. Moreover, the model predicts the inflation bias to be the larger, the more relative weight is attached to the ambitious output (or employment) target.
In the aftermath of the publication of the Barro-Gordon-model several authors expressed their doubts on the Barro-Gordon-model as an empirical relevant positive theory of inflation.
1 To some extent, these doubts evolved as a consequence of the fact that for a long period of time no serious attempts were made at testing for 1 inflation biases (Walsh 2003, p. 412) . Nevertheless, well before Romer (1993) , Ireland (1999) and Berlemann (2005) presented empirical evidence in favor of the Barro-Gordon-model, the model established quite quickly as a standard framework to study the behavior of monetary authorities.
The Barro-Gordon-model inspired a large literature on how to overcome the time inconsistency problem of monetary policy. 2 Among the most prominent proposals is the delegation solution, suggesting the government hand over the sole responsibility of monetary policy to an independent central bank. However, central bank independence is only a necessary but not a sufficient condition to ease the inflation bias. This is due to the fact that delegating monetary policy to an independent central bank sharing the same objective function as the government would not lead to a reduction of the inflation bias. In order to mitigate the inflation bias a somewhat independent central bank has to be governed by a "conservative" central banker, putting less relative weight on the ambitious output target than the government (and thus the median voter). In an influential article, Rogoff (1985) showed how to detect the optimal degree of conservatism of a central banker for the case of a completely independent central bank. He thereby contributed considerably to deepen our understanding of the importance of institutional aspects for monetary policy.
Maybe the most prominent example of a country with an an independent central bank and conservative central bank is Germany. Before the German Bundesbank became part of the European System of Central Banks it ranked among the most independent central banks of the world, regardless of the applied ranking method. Moreover, the presidents of the German Bundesbank had a strong reputation for being highly inflation averse. Of course, the German solution was chosen well before the academic debate on the importance of central bank independence and conservatism unfolded. However, the academic debate provided the economic rationale for this concept and was surely one of the driving forces of the observable international trend towards increasing the degree of central bank independence.
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Inspired by Rogoff's work and the growing interest of monetary authorities a substantial literature on the empirical measurement and the effects of central bank independence evolved. Various measures of legal and factual central bank independence were developed and related to macroeconomic variables. 5 However, up to now comparatively few attempts were undertaken to study the degree of conservatism.
In the light of the fact that central bank independence without conservatism is insufficient to solve the problem of time inconsistency, this is a severe shortcoming. show that more effective conservative monetary policy tends to react less active 4 See e.g. Berger et al. (2001) or Eijffinger et al. (1996) . Forder (2005) offers a variety of explanations of the spread of central bank independence.
5 A survey of this literature can be found in Berger et al. (2001) . 6 Furthermore, the literature often fails to distinguish properly between the concepts of central bank independence and conservatism. For a similar view see Lippi (2000) or Berger and Woitek (2005). 3 to shocks to the real economy. 7 In order to illustrate the proposed methodology we then estimate a common prime rate reaction function for a sample of 11 central banks in a panel setting and allow the reaction to real disturbances to differ between countries.
The paper is organized as follows: In section 2 we introduce the theoretical framework and derive a central bank's optimal prime rate reaction function. Section 3 deals with a brief review of the empirical literature on central bank independence and conservatism. In section 4 we present our empirical design, the data and the estimation results. The paper ends with a summary of the main findings and some conclusions.
Effective conservatism in a game-theoretic model of monetary policy
Our theoretical model stands in the tradition of the literature which initiated the discussion on central bank independence and conservatism evolved, i.e. the gametheoretic model of monetary policy as proposed by Barro and Gordon (1983) and further developed by Rogoff (1985) and Eijffinger and Hoeberichts (1998) . There are two actors in the standard monetary policy game: a monetary authority controlling inflation and trade unions bargaining wages collectively, thereby forming rational expectations on the inflation rate. In line with this literature we employ an expectations-augmented Phillips-curve
where u t denotes (the log of) unemployment in period t,ū the (log of) natural rate of unemployment, π t inflation, π e t the trade unions' inflation expectations and υ t a 7 As Berger and Woitek (2005) state, the implications of effective conservatism with respect to the reaction to macroeconomic shocks depend on structural and dynamic characteristics of the economy. Since the later reported empirical results fit the common perception of effective conservatism quite well, the use of the employed theoretical framework seems to be justified.
white-noise random shock. The standard model of Barro and Gordon (1983) implies that the monetary authority directly and perfectly controls inflation. Following Ruge-Murcia (2003) and Walsh (2003) we assume that the monetary authority imperfectly controls inflation using a policy instrument i which is linked to inflation according to
with η being a white-noise control error.
Following Eijffinger and Hoeberichts (1998) 
The government's one-period loss function is given by
where β G is the weight the government assigns to the goal of high employment relative to the goal of stable prices. Following Barro and Gordon (1983) we assume that the government's loss function coincides with the social loss function.
The loss function of a weight-conservative central banker can be denoted as
with β C = β G −β andβ > 0. Inserting (4) and (5) in (3) yields the objective function of the monetary authority
where β M = β G −β · I can be interpreted as the degree of effective monetary policy conservatism depending on the degrees of conservatism of the government and the central banker as well as the degree of central bank independence.
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The sequential structure of the game is as follows: First, the monetary authority announces an inflation rate. Then, trade unions form their inflation expectations and anticipate them during wage negotiations. Afterwards the shock υ t realizes and finally the monetary authority determines the rate of inflation and sets its policy instrument i in order to minimize its expected loss.
Formally, the Nash-solution can be calculated by differentiating the monetary authority's loss function with respect to the inflation rate. Taking the rational expectation of the first-order condition, solving for expected inflation and inserting the result into the first-order condition yields
Thus, we can conclude that the well-known inflation bias depends inversely on the degree of effective monetary policy conservatism (β M = β G −β · I). Obviously, central bank independence and the conservatism of both the government and the central banker are (imperfect) substitutes in easing the inflation bias in the described framework.
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With i being the policy interest rate of a monetary authority the optimal interest rate change ∆ * i t is calculated by inserting (7) in (2):
8 Note, that lower values of β G −β · I correspond to a higher degree of effective conservatism. 9 This result does not hold in the framework used by Lippi (2000) . However, his interpretation is quite different from Rogoff's (1985) original line of argument. He defines conservatism as the difference between the median inflation target of society and that of the central bank and thus quite differently from the rest of the literature. In this paper we stick to the more common interpretation of conservatism which is concerned with the weighting parameters.
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The stochastic shocks υ t on unemployment cause fluctuations around the natural level. According to equation (8) central banks will partially offset supply shocks via interest rate variations. For a given unemployment shock υ t the interest rate variation decreases in effective conservatism.
In equilibrium the shock can be expressed in terms of fluctuations of the rate of unemployment around its natural level, i.e. the unemployment gap u t . Inserting equilibrium inflation and inflation expectations in (1) yields
Hence, we can substitute υ t in (8) by equation (9):
Thus, the relation between the unemployment gap and the optimal prime rate change reveals information on the central bank's effective degree of conservatism.
Previous empirical evidence
Most empirical studies in the field engage in attempts to relate policy outcomes such as inflation or unemployment to different measures of central bank independence or conservatism. Most of these studies find a significant negative correlation between central bank independence and/or conservatism on the one hand and inflation and/or inflation variance on the other.
A first strand of the literature engages in developing indices of statutory central bank independence. In order to do so, authors like Bade and Parkin (1988) , Alesina (1989) , Grilli et al. (1991) , Schaling (1992), Cukierman (1992) , Alesina and Summers (1993) , Barro (1995) , Loungani and Sheets (1997) , Lybek (1999) , Maliszewski (2000) and Freytag (2002) analyze the existing legal rules defining the degree of formal central bank independence. 10 While these studies differ considerably in sample countries, sample periods, applied categories and weighting methods almost all of them find significantly negative correlations between statutory measures of central bank independence on the one hand and inflation (and sometimes inflation variance) on the other.
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However, especially in developing and transition countries the legal rules differ heavily from factual practices (Forder 1996 (Forder , 1998 . While anecdotal evidence on this hypothesis is available for various countries (Hochreiter and Kowalski 2000) , the case of Bulgaria throughout the 1990s provides an excellent example for the differences between de-jure-rules and de-facto-behavior. As described in Berlemann
and Nenovsky (2004) One of the few attempts to measure the degree of conservatism explicitly has recently been made by Berger and Woitek (2005) . Their basic approach is to classify the members of the German Bundesbank Council according to their conservatism.
In order to do so Berger and Woitek study who nominated the single Council mem- In practice monetary authorities appear to alter interest rates in a sequence of small steps to reach the desired interest rate level. In line with most of the literature, we therefore allow for interest rate smoothing in our empirical approach and assume the following dynamic adjustment of interest rates to the optimal level i * t (see e.g. Judd and Rudebusch 1998):
In consequence, the reaction function takes the form:
To analyze the degree of effective conservatism we estimate a common interest rate reaction function in a panel framework and allow for differing reaction coefficients for unemployment gaps while -in line with the model's predictions -assuming common coefficients for all additional control variables. Rearranging equation (12) and using n as a country index allows us to separate four determinants of central banks' interest rate decisions. The preferred interest rate variation is the sum of a country-specific effect
the lagged effect of the central banks' interest rate policies
the lagged effect of inflation
and the reaction to the unemployment gap
Different from Eijffinger et al. (1996) Due the discrete steps in the interest rate policy the preferred variation of the prime rate is not directly observable. Thus, we can interpret ∆i n,t as a continuous latent variable defined by
In line with the basic assumption of the logit estimation approach we assume the residual n,t to follow a standard logistic distribution. Instead of the preferred variations from equation (17), we observe the discrete variations of the prime rate.
The central banks' behavior is consistent with the assumption that the preferred change in the prime rate has to exceed certain threshold levels to be realized. With λ 0 ,λ 1 being the unobservable threshold levels (cutpoints) we can express the factual prime interest rate variations as
The ordered logit approach is based upon the idea to estimate the cumulative probabilities of the different outcomes of the dependent variable. The cumulative probabilities are given by
with j denoting the three classes of possible prime rate variations (lowered, constant, raised). Thus, P cum 0,n,t is the probability that the central bank in country n will reduce the prime rate in period t. Analogously, P cum 1,n,t is the probability that the prime rate is either reduced or held constant. Based on the cumulative probabilities we can calculate the so-called logits as
Using the calculated logits we then estimate the coefficients of the equation
using the maximum likelihood procedure. The estimated coefficients describe the influence of the right-hand variables on the cumulative logits and thus on the probabilities for the three different prime rate scenarios. By estimating equation (21) we also obtain values for the cutpointsλ 0 ,λ 1 .
General estimation issues and data
Our dataset consists of 11 industrialized countries: Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States. We make use of monthly data for the period of January 1988
to December 1998. Thus, our sample period covers the pre-EMU era, ending with the takeover of responsibility for monetary policy by the European Central Bank.
While the sample period is long enough to have sufficient observations to study central bank behavior it is also short enough to assume reaction coefficients to be stable.
Some of the sample countries took part in the European Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM). One might suspect that estimating Taylor-type monetary policy rules is misleading in this context because the referring central banks had to chose their prime interest rates to keep their exchange rates under control. However, none of the sample countries ever fixed its exchange rate completely to the anchor currency, the ECU. While the ERM demanded the participating countries to hold their exchange rates within a certain band, the exchange rates were always flexible to a certain extent, thus giving the referring countries at least some room to react on the actual economic situation. While this band was relatively narrow in the beginning (+/-2,25%) it was widened very soon to +/-15% which is very close to free floating exchange rates. While the US, Canada, Switzerland and Sweden did not take part in the ERM, Germany was the only sample country which decided to keep its interest rate within the narrow bands of (+/-2,25%) througout the whole sample period. UK and Italy took part in the narrow bands system from October 1990 until April 1992. Both countries decided to leave the ERM during the ERM crisis of early 1992. Spain, France, Denmark and Belgium switched in 1992 to the wide +/-15% exchange-rate-bands. Finally, Finland did not take part in the ERM before 1996 and then in the version with wide bands. Summing up, the central banks in our sample were not too much restricted in their monetary policies during the sample period by the ERM mechanism. This conclusion is in line with a number of other papers engaging in estimating Taylor-rules for the EU countries for similar sample periods (see e.g. Gerlach and Schnabel (2000) ).
The time series data we use in our empirical study were extracted from the OECD Main Economic Indicators Database. The left-hand variable in our estimation is the change in the prime interest rate. As described earlier we transformed the change in the prime interest rate into a ternary variable with the value of +2 if the prime rate was raised, +1 if the prime rate was kept constant and 0 if the prime rate was lowered.
We estimate the unemployment gap on the basis of seasonally adjusted standardized unemployment rates. Since this time series was not available for Switzerland we use the share of registered unemployed in the labor force in this case.
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While a number of different approaches to estimate unemployment or output gaps were proposed in the literature, there is yet no consensus view on the appropriate method. 16 We employ a Hodrick-Prescott-filter to calculate the unemployment potential (Hodrick and Prescott 1997 , Gerdesmeier and Roffia 2004 , Adam and Cobham 2004 . 17 Furthermore we normalized the gap measures to a mean of 0 and a variance of 1. This seems to be adequate since the variance of the gaps differed considerably between countries. However, the empirical results are quite similar for non-normalized unemployment gaps.
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While the simple theoretical framework presented in section 2 is useful to identify the variables in the central bank reaction functions, it can hardly be employed to specify the appropriate lag structure of the interest rate reaction functions. According to the model the optimal reaction is, inter alia, a function of the current unemployment gap. However, due to publication lags of the data on the real economy (e.g. Nelson 2000, p. 13) it might be appropriate to use lagged unemployment gaps. We let the data decide on the optimal lag structure in the interest rate reaction function and employ the Akaike (AIC) and the Bayesian information criterion (BIC) for this purpose. For the unemployment gap we allow lags up to two months. Since our study focuses on the country-specific reaction of central banks to the unemployment gap we allow the lag specification to differ between central banks of the sample countries.
Inflation was calculated on the basis of the consumer price index (all items).
According to the model, inflation should enter the interest rate reaction function with a lag. Again, we employed the information criteria to select the optimal lag structure. We allowed for inflations lags of up to 6 months.
16 See Billmeier (2004) for a review of various approaches. 17 The gaps were computed from 1979 to 2007 thus avoiding typical start-and endpoint problems of the filter-method. The smoothing parameter in our baseline specification is 100000. However, the results are quite robust with respect to different levels of the smoothing parameter. 18 The results are available from the authors on request.
All time series of regressors were tested for stationarity. 
Estimation results
The estimation results are summarized in table 1. 20 Column (1) displays the result for the baseline specification (equation (21)) using the first difference of lagged year-on-year inflation rates and the standardized and normalized unemployment gap. All coefficients have the expected sign. Except for Sweden and Germany the country-specific reaction coefficients of the unemployment gaps are significant at least on a 95%-level. The unconditional probabilities for the three outcomes of the ternary variable can be deduced from the estimated cutpoints. The unconditional probability for a more restrictive monetary policy is 15.2 %, the one for a more expansive monetary policy is 20.2 % and the one for an unchanged monetary policy course is 64.6 %.
In figure 1 we show a country ranking of the average degrees of effective conser- 109.5*** 130.9*** 103.4*** 162.4*** 130.9*** 167.6*** Pseudo R 2 0.043 0.049 0.044 0.061 0.049 0.063 Significance levels are reported as follows: * for a 90%-significance-level, ** for 95% and *** for more than 99%. We use Huber-White robust estimates. Country-specific effects are not reported. Column (I) is the baseline specification using a HP-filtered normalized unemployment gap with a smoothing parameter of 100000 and lagged year-on-year inflation rates. Columns (II) and (IV) to (VI) use a lead of inflation. In column (III) the results of an estimation using AR(p) forecasts of inflation are displayed. Column (IV) adds international prime rate changes as a control variable to the baseline specification. Column (V) incorporates the exchange rate vis-á-vis the ECU for countries in the ERM. Column (VI) incorporates both, the exchange rate and the international prime rate changes, and adds a dummy-variable for the years 1992 and 1993. , 1988-1998 employment gap of 1 pp raises the probability of a prime rate cut by 21.63 pp.
With 13.92 pp and 13.03 pp we obtain quite large changes in the probability for expansionary policies in Spain and France. We also find comparatively low degrees of effective monetary policy conservatism for Denmark (9.58 pp), the United States (8.13 pp) and Belgium (7.23 pp) . Even though there is a significant response to changes in unemployment gaps, the central banks of the United Kingdom ( 
The estimated equation was then utilized to forecast inflation for the next 18 to 19 24 months. 21 Doing so we obtain forecasts Eπ n,t+h for each country, each forecast horizon h (h = 18, ..., 24) and the entire sample period. 22 However, the constructed inflation forecasts (first difference, ∆Eπ n,t+h ) turn out to be insignificant in specification (III). While the coefficients slightly change, the ranking of central banks remains stable.
Since specification (II) turns out to be the most reasonable estimation variant as far as inflation is concerned we use this specification as basis for all additional stability tests.
Central banks might be tempted to react to international interest rate trends in order to prevent massive capital outflows and/or to prevent major exchange rate adjustments. We therefore add the change in the interest rate of the G7-countries ∆i w t to the regression in specification (IV). 23 The coefficient of the G7-interest-rate turns out to be highly significant. However, the ranking of central banks again remains stable in this specification.
Since some of our sample countries took part in the ERM we can not rule out, that interest rate decisions were also influenced by the motive to keep exchange rates within the relevant bands. For ERM countries we therefore added the change in the exchange rate towards the European Currency Unit (∆ECU ) as explanatory variable to the regression in specification (V). 24 The coefficient turns out to have the expected positive sign but is not significantly different from zero. The additional 21 The equations were obtained using Newey-West-Least-Square estimates. Lags were included as long as all autoregressive components remained significant on a 90%-confidence-level. 22 The appropriate lead structure h in the reaction function was again determined using the information criteria AIC and BIC. 23 The G7-interest-rate is calculated using a GDP-weighted prime rate of the G7-countries. GDPs are measured in US dollars. The weights were calculated on an annual basis using the end-of-period exchange rate. For the G7 countries in our sample, the national prime rate was excluded when calculating the G7-interest rate.
24 Due to stationarity issues we again used the first difference of exchange rates. Whenever a country did not take part in the ERM the referring value of the variable is zero, since the existence of the ERM can hardly play a role in this case. The necessary exchange rate data was taken from the IMF database. 20 results remain virtually unchanged.
Finally, we checked in how far the finding of Gerlach and Schnabel (2000) that interest rates in the EMU countries can be explained by a Taylor-type interest rate rule, except for the period of 1992 to 1993, has an influence on our empirical results.
In order to do so, we constructed a dummy variable for this period (D 92/93 ) and added it to the regression equation. In fact, the dummy turns out to be significant. However, the unemployment-gap-coefficients and thus the ranking results again remain stable.
Summary and conclusions
In this paper we developed an empirical measure of average effective monetary policy conservatism for a sample of 11 industrialized countries over a sample period from 1988 to 1998. Due to the relatively scarce number of observations we did not engage in attempts to relate this measure to the macroeconomic performance of these countries.
Of course, it is interesting to relate our results to those of comparable studies.
As we discussed in section 3, a large number of studies was conducted to measure central bank independence and/or conservatism. However, most of these studies are hardly comparable to our results because of the differing sample countries and periods. We therefore concentrate our comparison on the famous index of legal central bank independence of Cukierman (1992) .
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Cukierman's (1992) index of legal central bank independence covers all countries in our sample. While the original index was developed on the basis of the circumstances in the 1980's and thus earlier than our sample period, a later reexamination (see Cukierman and Lippi 1999) came to the result that the index (1) the unemployment gap with a smoothing parameter of 100000 is tested. In row (2) the unemployment gap with a smoothing parameter of 14400 is tested. The tests use (I) an exogenous intercept, (II) no exogenous regressors in the test equations. For the ADF and the PP the null hypothesis of a unit root can be rejected * on a 90%-, ** on a 95%-and *** on a 99%-confidence-level. For the KPSS the null hypothesis of stationarity can not be rejected + on a 99%-, ++ on a 95%-and +++ on a 90%-confidence-level. 
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